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This article summarizes many of the U.S. Supreme
Court's criminal law decisions of the last term.
CONFESSIONS
Miranda
In Stansbury v. California, 114 U.S. 1526 (1994), the
police were looking for the murderer of a 10-year old girl.
A witness had observed a turquoise car near the location
where the body had been found. Other information indicated that the girl had spoken to two different ice cream truck
drivers. Stansbury was one. Initially, however, the other
driver was the leading suspect. When the police arrived at
Stansbury's house, they told him that they were investigating a homicide and that he was a possible witness. He
voluntarily agreed to accompany them to the police station.
The investigating detective interviewed Stansbury without
first reading Miranda warnings. During the inter~iew,
Stansbury mentioned that he had returned home after work
and left his trailer about midnight in his housemate's
turquoise car. When Stansbury admitted to prior convictions
for rape, kidnaping, and child molestation, the detective
terminated the interview and advised him of his Miranda
rights.
Stansbury moved to suppress the statements made to
the detective prior to the Miranda warnings. The trial court
ruled that Stansbury was not in custody until he mentioned
the turquoise car. At that point the detective had "focused"
on him as the assailant. The California Supreme Court
affirmed, agreeing that "custody" occurred when the detective focused on Stansbury once the turquoise car was mentioned.
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Miranda
warnings are required only ~hen a suspect is subjected to
custodial interrogation. The term "custody" is defined as a
''formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the
degree associated with a formal arrest." California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). Whether the officer
''focused" on the suspect is not relevant, unless the officer's
subjective view is communicated to the suspect: "It is well
Chief Public Defender James A. Draper
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settled, then, that a police officer's subjective view that the
individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed,
does not bear upon the question whether the individual is in
custody for purposes of Miranda:' Stansbury, 114 S. Ct. at
1529-30.
The custody issue is determined by an objective test:
Would a reasonable person believe, based on all the circumstances, that she was under arrest or its equivalent? If
the officer's subjective views are communicated to the suspect, that fact along with other factors is reievant to determining "custody:' Even, then, the communication is not
determinative: "Even a clear statement from an officer that
the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in
itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects
are free to come and go until the police decide to make an
arrest:' /d. at 1530. A police officer's statement that the
suspect is under arrest is different; such a statement constitutes "custody:'
The objective test cuts against the police in some circumstances. For example, an officer's view that a person is not
a suspect is also not determinative. Such a subjective view
would not matter if the person's freedom had been restricted
to such a degree that the person was in effect under arrest.
Waiver of Right to Counsel
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Supreme
Court held that once a suspect asserts the right to counsel
after receiving Miranda warnings, the police must cease
questioning until counsel is made available or the suspect
reintiates the conversation. In Davis v. United States, 55
Grim. L. Rep. 2206 (1994), a suspect waived the right to
remain silent and right to counsel when first questioned
about a murder. An hour and half into the interview, Davis
said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer:' At this point, the
investigators asked Davis if he wanted an attorney present.
He said that he was not asking for an attorney and then
added: "No, I don't want a lawyer:' The interview then continued for another hour. Finally, Davis commented: "I think I
want a lawyer before I say anything else:· The interrogation
ceased. At trial, Davis moved to suppress his statements.
Telephone (216) 443-7223
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The lower courts had adopted three different approaches
when the police are faced with an ambiguous comment
concerning counsel. First, some courts had ruled that any
comment about counsel, not matter how ambiguous,
requires the cessation of questioning. Second, other courts
had attempted to define a threshold standard; comments
falling short of this threshold did not qualify as an invocation
of the right to counsel. Third, still other courts had adopted
a "stop and clarify'' approach.
On review, the Supreme Court ruled Davis' statements
admissible. The Court rejected all these approaches for
one more favorable to the police. The Court held that the
Edwards rule applies only when a suspect "unambiguously''
requests counsel. The opinion goes on to note:
Although the suspect need not 'speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don,' ... he must articulate his
desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would
understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the required level of
clarity, Edwards does not require the officers to stop
questioning the suspect. /d.
The Court recognized that its requirement of "a clear
assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some
suspects who - because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons - will not clearly
articul::~tA thAir rinht to counsel althouah they actually want
to ha~~-~ i~;y~r"'present." ld The primary protection for
these suspects, however, is the Miranda warnings themselves. If the suspect waives the right to counsel after
receiving the warnings, the police may question that suspect. Edwards provides an extra safeguard, but only if the
suspect makes an unambiguous request for an attorney.
The "need for effective law enforcemenf' requires a bright
line rule for the police.
While the Court indicated that a "stop and clarify" rule
would often be "good police practice;' such a rule is not
constitutionally required.

shall not be inadmissible solely because of a delay in presenting the accused before the magistrate.
The issue that had divided the courts concerned the interval after the six hour "safe harbor" period. Some courts had
ruled that confessions obtained after the six-hour interval
were automatically inadmissible. Noting that the statute
was silent about the post six-hour time frame, other courts
had ruled that a delay was only one factor in determining
the voluntariness of a confession made in this time frame.
The Supreme Court dodged this issue by ruling that the
statute did not apply when a person is arrested on statt:t
charges. The statute comes into play only when a person is
arrested on federal charges. In this case, the defendant
had confessed before he was arrested for the federal crime.
The Court did acknowledge that a different issue would
be raised if the defendant could show that federal and state
law enforcement officers colluded by having state police ·
arrest a person for questioning by federal officers. In a
1943 case, the Court had held that a confession obtained in
this way was inadmissible. Anderson v. United States, 318
U.S. 350 (1943). This exception, however, did not apply in
Alvarez-Sanchez because there was no evidence of a collusive arrangement.
The Court also acknowledged that state police officers
often are authorized to arrest on federal charges, in which
case § 3501 applies: "If a person is arrested and held on a
federal charae by 'any' law enforcement officer- federal,
state, or local --that· person is under 'arrest or other detention' for purposes of §3501 (c) and its 6-hour safe harbor
period:' Alvarez-Sanchez, 114 S.Ct. at 1604.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The Court returned once again to the constitutionality of
peremptory challenges. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), the Court had ruled that the Equal Protection
Clause governs the exercise of peremptory challenges by a
prosecutor in a criminal case. An accused has "the right to
be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to
nondiscriminatory criteria:• /d. at 85-86. In a series of later
cases, the Court extended this ruling to civil cases,
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991),
and to the defense, Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348
(1992).
These cases, however, involved racial discrimination, and
the issue of whether the Batson rationale extended to gender had divided the lower courts. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rei. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994), the Supreme Court
answered that question in the affirmative. The case
involved a paternity and child support action. The State
used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove male jurors,
and the defendant used all but one of his strikes to remove
female jurors. As a result, all jurors were female.
The Court had addressed the gender-jury issue in Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), where the Court had
ruled that the systematic exclusion of females from the jury
pool violated the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section
requirement: "Restricting jury service to only special groups
or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the
community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial:' /d. at 530. The Court, however, had never
applied the fair cross-section requirement to the actual jury
selected. As long as females and racial minorities were not
excluded from the jury pool, the petit jury seated in a particular case need not reflect racial or gender diversity.

Federal Statute
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 114 S. Ct. 1599 (1994),
involved an interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3501. During a
search of the defendant's residence, local police officers
discovered narcotics and counterfeit Federal Reserve
Notes. The defendant was arrested on state narcotics
charges. Three days later, while the defendant was still in
custody, Secret Service agents interviewed him. The defendant waived his Miranda rights and admitted that the Notes
were counterfeit. He was then arrested on federal charges
and presented on the federal complaint. ·
The defendant argued that the three-day delay between
his arrest on state charges and his presentment on federal
charges violated § 3501 (c) and therefore rendered the confession inadmissible. Congress had adopted § 3501 to
modify the "McNabb-Mallory'' rule, which was based on
Federal Criminal Rule 5(a). That rule required the prompt
("without unnecessary delay") presentment of persons
arrested for federal crimes before a magistrate or state
judge. The Supreme Court had held in McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957), that confessions obtained during an
unnecessary delay are generally inadmissible. Congress
altered this rule when it adopted§ 3501. Subsection (c)
provides that confessions obtained within six hours of arrest
2

Unlike Taylor, however, Batson was based on equal protection grounds; it held that the use of peremptories to
exclude racial minorities violated the 14th Amendment. In
other contexts involving gender-based classifications, the
·~ Court had held that an exceedingly persuasive justification
was required to survive equal protection scrutiny. The Court
had little trouble extending Batson to gender discrimination.
The State attempted to justify its exclusion of males on
the rationale that men would be more sympathetic than
women to a male paternity defendant. This made the
Court's decision easy: "We shall not accept as a defense to
gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype
the law condemns."' J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1426.
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The Court found the term "moral evidence" unproblematic
because it was explained in the instruction. The jury was
told to decide the case on the trial evidence and not from
any other source. They were also informed that evidence
consisted of the testimony of witnesses, writings, material
objects, and anything offered to prove a fact.
The term "moral certainty" was more troublesome. The
Court was willing to concede that the term, standing alone,
"might not be recognized by modern jurors as a synonym
for 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt."' Victor, 114 S. Ct. at
1247. Nevertheless, the instruction as a whole sufficiently
informed the jury of the constitutional requirement. In particular, the Court rejected the notion that the term was deficient because it cast the standard in terms of probabilities.
The Court noted that ''the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is itself probabilistic:· /d. Accordingly, the "problem is
not that moral certainty may be understood in terms of
probability, but that a jury might understand the phrase to
mean something less than the very high level of probability
required by the Constitution in criminal cases:· /d.
The instruction noted that the jurors had to have an "abiding conviction, to a moral certainty:· This explanation, plus
the remainder of the charge, satisfied the constitutional
standard. The Court also commented that it did
not condone the use of the phrases. As modern dictionary definitions of moral certainty attest, the common
meaning of the phrase has changed since it \vas used
in the Webster instructions, and it may continue to do so
to the point it conflicts with the [constitutional] standard.
/d. at 1248.

REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION
In Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (1994), the Court
reviewed two cases involving jury instructions on the
"beyond a reasonable doubf' standard. Although due
process requires the prosecution to prove the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it
does not require that any particular words be used to convey this standard - so long as ''taken as a whole, the
instructions correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable
doubt." Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954).
The Court has also commented that "[a]ttempts to explain
the term 'reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it
any clearer to the minds of the jury." Miles v. United States,
103 U.S. 304,312 (1881). See also Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S.
430, 440-41 (1887) (''The rule may be, and often is, rendered obscure by attempts at definition, which serve to create doubts instead of removing them:').
In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), the Court ruled
a jury instruction unconstitutional that included the following
passages: (1) "It must be such doubt as would give rise to
a grave uncertainty:• (2) "It is an actual substantial doubt:'
{3) "What is required is not an absolute or mathematical
certainty, but a moral certainty:' According to the Court,
these passages watered-down the constitutional standard.
The Court wrote:
It is plain to us that the words "substantial" and
"grave:' as they are commonly understood, suggest a
higher degree of doubt than that is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard. When those
statements are then considered with the references to
"moral certainty:· rather than evidentiary certainty, it
becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on
a degree of proof below that required by the Due
Process Clause. /d. at 41 .

Nebraska Instruction
The companion case, from Nebraska, contained the following contested passages: "You may find an accused
guilty upon the strong probabilities of the case, provided
such probabilities are strong enough to exclude any doubt
of his guilt that is reasonable. A reasonable doubt is an
actual and substantial doubt arising from the evidence ...
as distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility,
from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture:·
The defendant argued that the phrase "beyond a substantial doubf' created a lower standard than "beyond a reasonable doubt:• Here, again, the Court found the phrase
"somewhat problematic" but nevertheless upheld the conviction. Other parts of the instruction provided an alternative
definition: a reasonable doubt is one that would cause a
reasonable person to hesitate to act. This formulation had
been approved repeatedly by the Court. See Holland, 348
U.S. at 140.

California Instruction
One of the cases before the Court involved a California
instruction. The defendant challenged several passages: "It
is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to
some possible or imaginary doubt:' Another passage used
the phrase "moral certainty:• Chief Justice Shaw's instruction
, in a 19th Century case was the genesis of this instruction.
': Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850). The
. defendant challenged the terms "moral certainty" and "moral
evidence:' When Webster was decided in 1850, those terms
had specific meanings, which were often equated with proof
, beyond a reasonable doubt. The question was whether a
. , 20th Century jury would understand 19th Century terms.

INSANITY DEFENSE
Shannon v. United States, 55 Grim. L. Rep. 2213 (1994),
raised a question concerning the Insanity Defense Reform
Act of 1984, the federal statute passed by Congress after
the acquittal of John Hinckley for the attempted assassination of President Reagan. Shannon argued that the Act
required an instruction on the consequences of a verdict of
"not guilty by reason of insanity [NGI]." He also argued that
such an instruction, if not required by the Act, should be
mandated under the common law because jurors may erroneously believe that a defendant found·NGI will be immediately released into society.
The Act, for the first time, created a comprehensive pro3

cedure for dealing with the insanity defense in federal
courts. Congress (1) changed the substantive test for
insanity, (2) required the accused to establish insanity by
clear and convincing evidence, (3) recognized a special verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity;' and (4) created a
comprehensive civil commitment procedure.
The Supreme Court ruled that an instruction on the consequences of a NGI verdict is not required. Nothing in the
Act requires the instruction. Nor did the Court believe that
the instruction should be adopted under its supervisory
authority. Providing jurors sentencing information "invites
them to ponder matters that are not within their province,
distracts them from their factfinding responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion:· /d. at 2215. In other
context, the courts presume that the jury will follow its
instructions. Finally, such an instruction may prove counterproductive. The only "consequence" that is clear is the
requirement of a "dangerousness" hearing within forty days.
"Instead of encouraging a juror to return an NGI verdict, as
Shannon predicts, such information might have the opposite
effect - that is, a juror might vote to convict in order to
eliminate the possibility that a dangerous defendant could
be released after 40 days or less:· /d. at 2217.
The Court, however, recognized a limited exception: "If,
for example, a witness or prosecutor states in the presence
of the jury that a particular defendant would 'go free' if found
NG!, it may be necessary for the district court to intervene
with an instruction to counter such a misstatement:• /d.

tions "but have also considered a defendant's past criminal
behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior:'
/d. at 1928. The constitutionality of considering such previous conduct is well-established. See Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241 (1949); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 '~j
(1986). Thus, a sentencing court could constitutionally
enhance Nichols' sentence based on evidence of the previous DUI offense, even without a conviction. If this is so,·
then it must be "constitutionally permissible to consider a
prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction based on the
same conduct where that conduct must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt:' Nichols, 114 S.Ct. at 1928.
The Court summarized its holding as follows:
[W]e hold, consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution, that an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no
prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to
enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction. /d.
This ruling is not limited to federal sentencing. It also
applies to state sentencing, including recidivist statutes.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In Montana Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114
S.Ct. 1937 (1994), the Supreme Court held that Montana's
Dangerous Drug Tax Act violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause because it permitted double punishment for the

same. conduct.

SENTENCING: UNCOUNSELED CONVICTIONS
In Nichols v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 1921 (1994), the
Supreme Court ruled that a sentencing court may use a
defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction,
where no prison term was imposed, "to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction:' /d. at 1928. This holding
overruled Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
Nichols pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with the
intent to distribute. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, he
had amassed three criminal history points for a 1983 felony
drug conviction. He was assessed another point for a 1983
state misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence (DUI); he was not represented by counsel and
received only a fine for this offense. This additional point
raised Nichols' Criminal History Category to category Ill and
resulted in a maximum sentence, which was 25 months
longer than it would have been had the misdemeanor not
been included. The Supreme Court affirmed Nichols' conviction.
Nichols argued that the use of the uncounseled misdemeanor conviction violated the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel as construed in Baldasar. The right to counsel
applies in misdemeanor cases only if actual incarceration is
imposed. Scott v.lllinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In Ba/dasarthe Court ruled
that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be
used to enhance punishment, even though constitutionally
valid, because no incarceration was imposed. This result
was somewhat anomalous; a constitutionally valid conviction could not be used for sentencing.
In Nichols, the Court overruled Baldasar, noting that sentencing procedures have traditionally been "recognized as
less exacting than the process of establishing guilt:'
Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927. Indeed, sentencing courts have
not only taken into consideration a defendant's prior convic4

The Act imposed a tax "on the possession and storage of '
dangerous drugs:· The tax was to be "collected only after
any state or federal fines or forfeitures have been satisfied:'
However, taxpayers must file a return within 72 hours of
their arrest. There is no obligation to file a return until an
~
arrest is made.
The Kurths were convicted for cultivating marijuana on
their ranch and for possession of hashish oil and drug para- i
phernalia. Two members of the Kurth family received prison
sentences, while four received suspended or deferred sentences. The Department of Revenue additionally sought
$900,000 in taxes, interest, and penalties on the marijuana
plants. The Kurths subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and alleged that the tax violated double jeopardy
principles. The bankruptcy judge agreed, as did the district
court, which concluded that the Act "simply punishes the
Kurths a second time for the same criminal conduct:' The
Court of Appeals affirmed but refused to hold the tax facially unconstitutional. The Montana Supreme Court reached a i
different conclusion in other cases. The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve these inconsistent decisions.
In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), the
defendant was convicted and sentenced for 65 separate
violations of the criminal false claims statute. In each
instance, he had claimed $12 for $3 services. In a subsequent civil proceeding, a $2,000 penalty for each false claim
was authorized. The Supreme Court found the resulting
$130,000 penalty double punishment, rejecting the argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause applied only to criminal proceedings. In the Court's view, a legislatively designated "civil penalty" could violate the Fifth Amendment.
Although Halper did not involve a tax, the Court stated that
"a tax is not immune from double jeopardy scrutiny simply
because it is a tax:· Kurth, 114 S.Ct. at 1946.
Generally, the unlawfulness of an activity does not prevent its taxation. A drug tax could be collected if the tax-

payer had not been previously punished, or if it was
imposed in the criminal proceeding. The inquiry focused on
whether the Montana statute was punishment disguised as
· .a tax. The Act did not function as a tax because its primary
~ goal was to punish and deter certain behavior rather than
to collect revenue ·and because it "is conditioned on the
commission of a crime:· /d. at 1947. The Court distinguished the Act from legitimate taxes, such as those on
tobacco, by noting that the justifications for that type of tax,
such as
creating employment, satisfying consumer demand, and
providing tax revenues, were not present in this instance.

Court upheld the admission of evidence regarding
Romano's death sentence from an earlier case during the
sentencing phase of his murder trial.
Romano was separately tried and convicted for two capital murders. The death sentence was imposed in the first
trial (Thompson). During the sentencing phase of the second trial (Sarfaty), the state offerea evidence of the earlier
death sentence to show that Romano was a violent felon
and would be a continuing threat to society. These factors
were aggravating_ circumstances under the Oklahoma death
penalty law. The second jury also imposed the death sentence. Romano objected, claiming that the evidence of his
first death sentence diminished the jury's sense of responsibility in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320
(1985). The Supreme Court disagreed.
In Caldwell, the jury was misled and its sense of responsibility undermined when the prosecutor and the trial judge
told the jurors not to view themselves as sentencing a man
to death because a death sentence would be appealed and
re-examined by the state supreme court. The U.S. Supreme
Court held that these remarks "precluded the jury from
properly performing its responsibility to make an individualized determination of the appropriateness of the death
penalty." /d. at 330-31. The Court subsequently narrowed
the holding of Caldwell: ''To establish a Caldwell violation, a
defendant must necessarily show that the remarks to the
jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by
local law:• Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989); see
also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
The Romano Court found that the evidence did not "contravene the principle established in Caldwell" because the
jury was not misled as to its responsibility in the sentencing
phase: ''The evidence at issue was neither false at the time
it was admitted, nor did it even pertain to the jury's role in
the sentencing process. The trial court's instructions, moreover, emphasized the importance of the jury's role:·
Romano, 114 S.Ct. at 2011 . That the evidence was irrelevant as a matter of state law did not render its admission
federal constitutional error.
The Court also rejected Romano's request that it ''fashion
general evidentiary rules, under the guise of the Eighth
Amendment, which would govern the admissibility of evidence at capital sentencing proceedings:· /d. at 2011.
Romano argued that the introduction of irrelevant evidence
(the death sentence) rendered his sentencing "unreliable"
and therefore violative of the Eight Amendment. However,
the Court held that since the irrelevant evidence was not
prejudicial, and because the jury instructions were proper,
there was no Eighth Amendment violation. The Court further declined to create evidentiary rules: "We have not
done so in the past ... and will not do so today:· /d.
Nor did this evidence violate the Due Process Clause.
The standard of due process review in capital cases is
whether the remarks "so infected the trial with unfairness as
to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process:·
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1 97 4). The
Romano Court held that since the jury could just as easily
have been influenced not to impose the death sentence by
the -remarks, there was no violation of due proc.ess.

DETAINERS
In Reed v. Farley, 129 L.Ed.2d 277 (1994), the Supreme
Court decided that a state court's failure to observe the
12D-day rule of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers [lAD]
is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus when the defendant did not object to the trial date at the time it was set and
suffered no prejudice.
Indiana took custody of Reed pursuant to the lAD, which
requires that a prisoner be tried within 120 days of arrival in
the receiving jurisdiction or else the charges are dismissed
with prejudice. However, the lAD does allow for extensions
upon a showing of "good cause:· The trial judge, unaware
of the 120-day limit, scheduled Reed's trial for a date that
was after the tollinq period. Reed never obiected to the trial
date until after the 120-day limit had expired.' The state courts
refused to grant him relief on the grounds that Reed should
have objected prior to the tolling date and because they
believed that he was aware of the violation prior to the tolling.
: Although the lAD is a voluntary interstate agreement, it is
· also a law of the United States subject to habeas review.
The Supreme Court's precedent had held that the lAD "is a
congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the
Compact Clause, US Canst, Art I, § 10, cl 3, and thus is a
federal law subject to federal construction:· Carchman v.
Hash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985). Moreover, "habeas review is
available to check violations of federal laws when the error
qualifies as 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in
a complete miscarriage of justice, [or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure:"
Reed, 129 L. Ed.2d at 288, citing Hill v. United States, 368
U.S. 424, 428 (1962); accord United States v. Timmreck,
441 U.S. 780 (1979); Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333
(1974). This was not, however, such a case:
When a defendant obscures Article IV(c)'s time prescription and avoids clear objection until the clock has
run, cause for collateral review scarcely exists. An
unwitting judicial slip of the kind involved. here ranks
with the nonconstitutionallapses we have held not cognizable in .a post-conviction proceeding. /d. at 288-89.
The Court also rejected Reed's argument that the 54-day
delay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial,
especially in light of the fact that Reed sought an extension
during those 54 days to better prepare his defense.
Additionally, "[a] showing of prejudice is required to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial
.
Clause, and that necessary ingredient is entirely missing
here." /d. at 291.

Jury Instruction on Parole Ineligibility
In Simmons v. South Carolina, 129 L..Ed.2d 133 (1994),
the Supreme Court ruled that where a state seeks the
death penalty based on the defendant's ''future dangerous-

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Instruction on Prior Death Sentence
In Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S.Ct. 2004 (1994), the
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ness" and state law prohibits release on parole, due
process requires that the jury be informed that the accused
is ineligible for parole.
Simmons, who was convicted of beating an elderly
woman to death, had recently pleaded guilty to multiple
counts of burglary and sexual assault (all involving elderly
women). These convictions rendered him parole ineligible if
convicted of another violent crime. During sentencing, the
state sought the death penalty based upon the aggravating
circumstance that Simmons posed a future danger to society. The defendant attempted to counter this point by arguing that he was a danger only to elderly women whom he
was not likely to meet in prison. When the jury asked if the
imposition of a life sentence included a possibility of parole,
the trial judge instructed it to consider life imprisonment in
its "plain and ordinary meaning:' The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, finding a due process violation.
"Future dangerousness" is a legitimate factor of jury consideration in a capital murder trial. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
Nevertheless, "a person may not be executed 'on the basis
of information which he had no opportunity to deny or
explain' because due process guarantees a defendant the
right to rebut or explain aggravating factors alleged by the
prosecution:' Simmons, 129 L. Ed.2d at 143.
The Court wrote that "there may be no greater assurance
of a defendant's future nondangerousness to the public
than the fact that he never will be released on parole:' /d. at
142. The Court further noted that "[a]n instruction directing
juries that life imprisonment should be understood in its
'plain and ordinary' meaning does nothing to dispel the misunderstanding reasonable jurors may have about the way in
which any particular State defines 'life imprisonment':· /d. at
146. Consequently, "[t]he trial court's refusal to apprise the
jury of information so crucial to its sentencing determination, particularly when the prosecution alluded to the defendant's future dangerousness in its argument to the jury,
cannot be reconciled with our well-established precedents
interpreting the Due Process Clause:' /d. at 142-43.

Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Accordingly, a capital defendant must be convicted of murder with a finding of at least
one aggravating circumstance at either the guilt or penalty
phase. However, the aggravating circumstance may not be
unconstitutionally vague. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420 (1980) (Georgia aggravating circumstance that offense
''was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim" held to be unconstitutionally vague in a
murder case).
In the sentencing phase, the trier of fact decides whether
to impose a death sentence on a defendant who may legally be executed. Of particular importance in this phase is
"an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime:'
Tuilaepa, 129 L.Ed.2d at 760, citing Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 879 (1983). Indeed, the sentencing phase adds a
subjective perspective to the objective view taken in the eligibility proceeding.
A vague circumstance may threaten the neutrality of the
sentencing process and encourage bias and arbitrary decision: "A vague propositional factor used in the sentencing
decision creates an unacceptable risk of randomness, the
mark of the arbitrary and capricious sentencing process
prohibited by Furman v. Georgia." /d. at 761. However, a
factor is not unconstitutional if it has some "common-sense
core of meaning ... that criminal juries should be capable of
understanding:' Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (White,
J., concurring).
Tuilaepa did not challenge the eligibility requirements for
imposition of the death sentence. Rather, he argued that
the circumstances of the crime, his prior criminal history,
and his age at the time of commission are unconstitutionally
vague factors. The Supreme Court disagreed: "The circumstances of the crime are a traditional subject for consideration by the sentencer, and an instruction to consider the
circumstances is neither vague nor otherwise improper
under our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence:' Tuilaepa, 129
L.Ed.2d at 762. Similarly, the defendant's prior history of
violent crime is important in deciding capital punishment.
This factor was not vague because it asked jurors to review
tangible and ascertainable "matters of historical fact." ld.
The Court used the same rationale to explain that age is a
relevant and tangible factor to be considered by a jury. See
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
Finally, the Court rejected Tuilaepa's argument that the
instructions were deficient because no basis for weighing
these factors was provided. Jurors need not be instructed
on how to evaluate facts in a capital sentencing decision.
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008-09 n.22 (1983)
("the fact that the jury is given no specific guidance on how
the commutation factor is to figure into its determination
presents no constitutional problem:'). Once the defendant
is eligible for the death penalty, it is within the discretion of
the sentencer to decide what factors are determinative of a
death sentence: the "sentencer may be given unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be
imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member
of the class made eligible for that penalty." Tuilaepa, 129
L.Ed.2d at 764, citing Zant, 462 U.S. at 875.

Vagueness of Aggravating Factors
In Tuilaepa v. California, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994), the
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that
California's sentencing factors are unconstitutionally vague.
In order to sentence a defendant to death in California,
the trier of fact must return a first degree murder verdict and
also find one or more of 19 special circumstances enumerated in the California death penalty statute. Then, in the
penalty phase, numerous other factors must be considered.
While robbing a bar, Tuilaepa shot and killed Melvin
Whiddon. He was convicted of first degree murder with
the special circumstance of murder while committing a
robbery. During the penalty phase, the judge instructed the
jury to consider various factors but did not provide a method
or standard for weighing and evaluating any of them.
Tuilaepa argued that the following factors were unduly
vague: (1) the circumstances of the crime, (2) whether the
defendant had a previous history of violent crime, and (3)
the defendant's age at the time of the crime.
Capital punishment jurisprudence addresses two different
aspects of the decisionmaking process: (1) the eligibility
decision and (2) the selection decision. The eligibility issue
deals with whether the defendant's crime is such that the
death penalty is a proportionate punishment. Coker v.
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Double Jeopardy
Schiro v. Farley, 114 S.Ct. 783 (1994), raised a double
jeopardy issue in the context of a death penalty proceeding.

. the same victim): (1) knowingly killing, (2) killing while
, committing rape, and (3) killing while committing sexually
' deviate behavior. He did not contest the killing but argued
.I insanity or guilty but mentally ill. These choices, plus lesser
included offenses, gave the jury ten possible verdict options.
The jury found Schiro guilty of "killing while committing
rape" and made no findings on the other verdict options.
At the sentencing phase, the state sought capital punishment based on the aggravating factor that Schiro had
committed an intentional murder while committing rape.
The jury recommended against capital punishment in light
, of mitigating evidence. However, in Indiana, the court is not
' bound by the jury's recommendation, and the judge
, imposed the death penalty.
· Schiro argued that the jury's failure to convict on the first
count ("knowingly killing") operated as an acquittal of intentional murder and therefore could not be used as an aggravating factor. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this double
jeopardy argument.
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second
prosecution after initial acquittal or conviction and also
against multiple punishments. North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969). Schiro argued that the sentencing
phase of his prosecution should have been considered as a
successive prosecution after the jury recommendation was
rejected. The Court disagreed, citing Stroud v. United
States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), in which the Court had held that
a defendant couid be resentenced after retriai when his
original murder conviction had been overturned on appeal.
Also, a second sentencing hearing may be held when the
initial hearing was improperly based. Lockhart v. Nelson,
488 U.S. 33 (1988). The Court noted "[i]f a second sentencing proceeding ordinarily does not violate the double
jeopardy clause, we fail to see how an initial sentencing
proceeding could do so:· Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 789.
The Court also distinguished Bullington v. Missouri,
451 U.S. 430 (1981 ). Bullington was convicted of capital

murder, but the jury refused to impose the death penalty.
When his conviction was overturned, he was retried and the
state again sought the death penalty. As a general rule,
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit a harsher
penalty on retrial following a successful appeal. Bullington,
however, recognized a limited exception in capital cases the first jury's failure to impose the death penalty is considered an acquittal on that issue. Nevertheless, Bullington
was not controlling because the "State did not reprosecute
Schiro for intentional murder, nor did it force him to submit
to a second death penalty hearing. It simply conducted
a single sentencing hearing in the course of a single
prosecution:· Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 790.
Schiro also argued that the state was "collaterally
estopped" from seeking the death sentence since the jury
had "acquitted" him of the "intentional murder" aggravating
circumstance. The collateral estoppel doctrine, however,
requires the defendant to "demonstrate that the issue
whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually
decided in the first proceeding:' Dowling v. United States,
493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990) (defendant did not meet his burden because there was more than one basis on which the
jury could have reached its conclusion). In this case, the
jury could very well have believed that it could only return
one verdict, especially since each side made this point
during closing arguments. Additionally, the instructions did
not "differentiate between the two ways of proving 'murder'
under Indiana law" and ''the jury verdict did not necessarily
depend upon a finding that Schiro lacked an intent to kill:'
Finally, the Court noted that even Schiro's attorney seemed
to believe that intent was not an issue since he never
argued that Schiro lacked the intent to kill: "In view of
Schiro's confession to the killing, the instruction requiring
the jury to find intent to kill, and the uncertainty as to
whether the jury believed it could return more than one
verdict, we find that Schiro has not met his [burden] ... :·
Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 792.
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